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Abstract
Several decades after Michotte’s work was published, it continues to inspire current research in
perception, cognition, and beyond. In this special issue we pay tribute to this heritage with a collec-
tion of empirical and theoretical papers on amodal completion and the perception of causality, two
areas of research within which Michotte’s work and ideas have had a lasting inXuence. As a back-
ground to better understand the remaining papers, we brieXy sketch Michotte’s life and work and the
scope (in breadth and in depth) of his impact. We then review Michotte’s seminal contributions to
the areas covered in this special issue, some of the major research discoveries and themes in the inter-
vening decades, and the major open questions and challenges we are still facing. We also include a
sneak preview of the papers in this special issue, noting how they relate to Michotte’s work and to
each other. This review shows both how much inXuence Michotte has had on contemporary percep-
tion and cognition research, and how much important work remains to be done. We hope that the
papers in this special issue will serve both to celebrate Michotte’s heritage in this respect, and to
inspire other investigators to continue the projects he began.
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1. Introduction
Albert Michotte is one of those remarkable Wgures in 20th-century psychology whose
work has stood the test of time in a special way. His research, though now many decades
old,  continues  to  inspire  and  inXuence  current  research  in  perception,  cognition,  and
beyond – especially work involving amodal completion and the perception of causality,
animacy, and intentionality. Michotte’s research projects typically began by noting rela-
tively straightforward aspects of our perceptual experience, such as the fact that we can see
causality, or that we often see partially occluded objects as partially occluded objects.
Although others had previously noted such phenomena, it was Michotte’s special insight
to both (1) recognize the deep implications these facts have for the nature of perception,
and (2) devise ways to study the processing which underlies such percepts. As a result, his
research – most notably reported in his books La perception de la causalité (Michotte,
1946)  and  Les  compléments  amodaux  des  structures  perceptives ( Michotte,  Thinès,  &
Crabbé, 1964) – forged new Welds of study, and continues to have a strong impact on cur-
rent studies on these topics, including developmental and neuroscientiWc work. In this spe-
cial issue we pay tribute to this heritage with a collection of empirical and theoretical
papers each of which illustrates Michotte’s lasting inXuence.
In this introductory paper we will brieXy sketch Michotte’s life and work, and note the
scope (in breadth and in depth) of his impact. We will then review Michotte’s seminal con-
tributions to the areas covered in this special issue, some of the major research discoveries
and themes in these areas in the intervening decades, and the major open questions and
challenges in these areas. We also include a sneak preview of the papers in this special issue,
noting how they relate both to Michotte’s work and to each other.
2. Michotte’s life and work
Many contemporary psychologists know the name of Michotte and will be able to con-
nect it to the topic of causal perception. Probably few, however, will have read his works
and most of these will know little about Michotte’s life and career. Although an interesting
autobiographical portrait was included in Boring et al.’s A history of psychology in autobi-
ography, vol. 4 (Michotte, 1952) and a more recent biography was included in Wertheimer
and Kimble’s Portraits of pioneers in psychology, vol. 5 (Gavin, 2003), it may be useful to
brieXy sketch Michotte’s life and career and to note some aspects of the historical context
within which they developed.
Albert Edouard Michotte van den Berck was born in Brussels on October 13, 1881, in a
wealthy, conservative, French speaking family. At the age of 18, Michotte began to study
philosophy at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at the Université Catholique de Louvain,1
where Armand Thiéry had just founded a small Laboratory of Experimental Psychology
(1894), after having studied with Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig. In 1899 Michotte graduated
1 At that time, the university (founded in 1425) was mainly French speaking, although it was located in Leuven,
a small town in Flanders, the Flemish-speaking region of the country. Later, in 1968, the university was split into
two. The Wrst stayed at the original location in Leuven and is now known as Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The
second moved to a new location, 30km south of Leuven, in the Walloon, French-speaking region of the country.
A new city was actually built to host the new university: Louvain-la-Neuve. The second is now known as Univer-
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with a Master’s thesis on the physiology and psychology of sleep and only one year later
(in 1900) he became doctor in philosophy with a Ph.D. thesis on the aesthetics of Herbert
Spencer. Immediately thereafter, he entered the faculty of science to obtain a degree of
Candidate in Natural Sciences (zoology) in 1902. He conducted research in physiology
under Arthur Van Gehuchten, a prominent Belgian neurologist, publishing two papers
(Michotte, 1904a, 1904b). In 1905, Michotte obtained the degree of “Maître agregé de
l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie” with a thesis on regional signs, his Wrst major work
(Michotte, 1905). After a couple of years of what we would now call postdoctoral research,
with Wundt in Leipzig  (1905) and Külpe  in Würzburg (1906–1908), Michotte became
responsible for a few courses in Leuven (including a practicum in experimental psychol-
ogy) and then became full professor in 1912, teaching to students in philosophy, science
and medicine. During the Wrst World-War (1914–1918), he emigrated to Holland where he
worked at the University of Utrecht with Zwaardemaker on the measurement of acoustical
energy.
In terms of topics, ideas, and research methods, Michotte (1952) himself divided his
career into three major stages. In the Wrst stage (1905–1920), he concentrated primarily on
the study of “higher processes” and he made extensive use of “systematic introspection”.
He  made  a  distinction  between  two  levels  of  mental  activity,  sensory  experience  and
thought. The higher level of thought did not add new mental elements to the lower-level
units of experience, their associations, the emotions they give rise to, etc., but could enrich
them by means of comprehensive syntheses and the use of symbols. One of the prime
examples of Michotte’s work in this period was his research on voluntary choice (Mich-
otte, 1912; Michotte & Prüm, 1910).
In the second stage (1920–1939), Michotte agreed with the behaviorist critique on the
scientiWc limitations of the method of introspection, but he did not agree that psychologi-
cal research had to be restricted to external, objective behavior. He was convinced that the
subject’s state of mind, how she understands the situation in which she Wnds herself, and
how she reacts to that situation, all remain essential in psychology. He believed that it was
possible to establish systematic relations between stimuli and reactions in the study of per-
ception (e.g., Michotte, 1927). His results and conclusions were similar in many ways to
those of Gestalt psychology, but he was essentially unaware of that tradition for a long
time (because the university library was destroyed in the war), until he met KoVka and
Kohler  at  the  International  Congress  of  Psychology  at  Oxford  in  1923.  However,  he
believed that it is futile to study perception in itself and that it should be treated instead as
a phase of action in relation to motor and intellectual activity of the individual as well as to
his needs.
Michotte’s third stage (1939–1962) was the most fruitful one, and clearly the one in
which he developed the ideas and methods for which he is most famous. Building on some
earlier ideas Wrst presented at the International Congress of Psychology at Yale in 1929 (for
a photograph, see Fig. 1) and in lectures at the Collège de France in Paris (in 1937), Mich-
otte  became  convinced  that  we  can  perceive  actions  performed  by  objects  or  animate
beings (“agents”) on one another in the same way as we can see simple kinetic movements.
This led him to Wnd a new line of research, using experimental methods to study funda-
mental  problems  of  phenomenology – especially involving the  perception  of  causality,
permanence, and apparent reality in our experience of the external world. It is in this
period, which he characterized as “experimental phenomenology”, that he performed his
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collaborators, on phenomenal permanence, including the well-known “tunnel eVect” (e.g.,
Knops, 1947; Michotte, 1950; Sampaio, 1943). It is also in this period that he attracted a
number of international collaborators (e.g., Burke, 1952; Glynn, 1954; Levelt, 1962; Yela,
1952). In addition to these now well-known perceptual topics, Michotte also continued to
work on other topics in perception and cognition (e.g., Michotte, 1955) and language (e.g.,
Michotte, 1959).
At the age of 71, Michotte oYcially retired in 1952, although he continued to lecture
courses in general and experimental psychology (both in French and in Flemish) until
1956, and he remained active in the laboratory even until 1962. At the age of 84, after a
very long and successful career, Albert Michotte died on June 2, 1965.
3. The impact of Michotte’s research
It  is  diYcult  to  overestimate  Michotte’s  impact  on  later  perception  and  cognition
research, but it is even more diYcult to quantify this impact properly, because most of
Michotte’s work was published in sources that are not incorporated in current databases.
Most of Michotte’s work was originally published in French, in the series Études de Psy-
chologie, published by Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie (later continued as
Studia Psychologica), and it thus took a long time for his ideas to become known outside
the French-speaking community. Only the second edition of his most famous book, La per-
ception de la causalité (Michotte, 1954), was translated into English (Michotte, 1963), and
that too only in 1963 (i.e., almost ten years after the second edition, and almost twenty
years after the Wrst edition). His second most famous work, Les compléments amodaux des
structures perceptives (Michotte et al., 1964) was translated into English only in 1991, when
Fig. 1. A photograph taken at Yale University, on the occasion of the International Congress of Psychology in
1929, where Michotte’s research on the perception of causality was Wrst publicly discussed. From left to right:
Charles Spearman, Karl Lashley, Edouard Claparède, Albert Michotte, Kurt KoVka, Kurt Lewin, Edgar Rubin.J. Wagemans et al. / Acta Psychologica 123 (2006) 1–19 5
it was included in a collection edited by Thinès, Costall, and Butterworth (1991), along
with other translated works by Michotte and his colleagues (mostly excerpted from Mich-
otte, 1947, 1962). This collection, more than 100 years after Michotte’s birth, served a great
need, as acknowledged by at least 6 independent reviewers of that book in Belgian, French,
English and American journals.2
These three major works (Michotte, 1946, 1954, 1963; Michotte  et al.,  1964; Thinès
et al., 1991) have been cited 419, 42, and 73 times, respectively, in papers indexed in the
Web of Science, as of September, 2005. This is not a tremendous number of citations, but
note that this database goes back only to 1972, which is 20 years after Michotte’s retire-
ment! Examining the distribution of 507 papers that cite one or more of these books, it is
striking to see that 67 date from the 1970s (1971–1980), 109 from the 1980s, 197 from the
1990s, and 134 from 2001 till 2005. So, the impact that Michotte has made appears not to
have decreased over the years – and, on the contrary, it seems to be growing. Also notewor-
thy is the quality of the sources within which these citations are found. The above three
books are cited regularly in Nature, Science, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, as well as in the best of our psychology journals (e.g., Annual Review of Psy-
chology,  Psychological  Bulletin,  Psychological  Review,  Cognitive  Psychology,  Cognition,
Journal of Experimental Psychology, etc.). In addition, Michotte’s work is still frequently
discussed in introductory psychology and perception textbooks. Equally impressive is the
distribution of citations across time and disciplines. To illustrate the temporal distribution,
it suYces to list some of the papers published in this very journal, Acta Psychologica, where
citations to Michotte’s work are found from the early 1950s (e.g., Gemelli & Cappellini,
1958; Johansson, 1950; Piéron, 1950) and 1960s (e.g., Coen-Gelders, 1967; Defares & De
Haan, 1962; Houssiadas, 1964; Kanizsa, 1969), to the 1980s (e.g., Gerbino & Salmaso,
1987; Wagemans & d’Ydewalle, 1989), the 1990s (e.g., Kourtzi & ShiVrar, 1999; Tse, 1999a;
Van Lier, 1999), and up until today (e.g., Massironi & Bressanelli, 2002).
Perhaps more impressive than the number of citations to Michotte’s work is the scope
of its impact across a wide variety of subWelds of cognitive science. To illustrate this scope,
we will brieXy sample the topics on which Michotte’s work has had a signiWcant impact
(moving from the most to the least obvious lines of inXuences, both within and outside psy-
chology), based on the references found in the Web of Science, as noted above.
Of course, Michotte’s work has had an especially strong inXuence on the study of per-
ception and visual cognition in human adults. This impact spans several diVerent topics in
this area, but perhaps most notable is the study of the ways in which the visual system
copes with incomplete visual input due to occlusion. His groundbreaking research on static
amodal completion has received a tremendous amount of direct study (as reviewed in more
detail below, and also in several of the other papers in this special issue), extending it from
2D displays to 3D contour interpolation and volume completion (e.g., Kellman, Garrigan,
& Shipley, 2005; Tse, 1999a, 1999b; Van Lier & Wagemans, 1999). Michotte himself also
extended his studies of visual completion into the dynamic realm, as best illustrated in his
studies of the “tunnel eVect”, wherein a moving object is seen to pass behind an occluder,
re-emerging as the same persisting individual. This phenomenon has also been incredibly
inXuential in recent work, inspiring studies of apparent motion (e.g., Blake, Ahlström, &
Alais, 1999; Yantis, 1995), change detection (e.g., Flombaum & Scholl, in press), bouncing
2 Baron in Contemporary Psychology, Ehrenstein in Perception, Fraisse in L’Année Psychologique, Heft in Psy-
chological Record, Wagemans in Psychologica Belgica, Wertheimer in American Journal of Psychology.6 J. Wagemans et al. / Acta Psychologica 123 (2006) 1–19
vs. streaming (e.g., Feldman & Tremoulet, 2006), and multiple object tracking (e.g., Scholl
& Pylyshyn, 1999). More broadly, Michotte’s focus on the endurance of objects over time
as the same perceived individuals has fueled a considerable amount of work on this impor-
tant question, including work employing the “object Wle” framework (e.g., Kahneman, Tre-
isman, & Gibbs, 1992; MitroV, Scholl, & Wynn, 2005).
Michotte’s work on animated displays has also inspired a large body of work on event
perception and cognition, focused on both physical events and the perception of animacy
and intentionality (e.g., Johansson, 1950; Johansson, von Hofsten, & Jansson, 1980; Restle,
1979; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). Clearly Michotte’s best-known
work on event perception involved the perception of causality (as reviewed in more detail
below, and also in several of the other papers in this special issue). This work has also inXu-
enced the study of other forms of causal processing, including work on causal reasoning
(e.g., Cheng, 1997; White, 1989, 1992), causal judgment (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986),
causal attribution (e.g., Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995; Kelley & Michela, 1980),
apparent mental causation (e.g., Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), and the treatment of causality
in language (e.g., Rudolph & Försterling, 1997; WolV & Song, 2003).
From  these  core  topics,  Michotte’s  inXuence  has  expanded,  like  concentric  waves
around a pebble thrown in a pond, inspiring wider theories of perception, including ecolog-
ical psychology, as acknowledged by J.J. Gibson (1967) in his autobiography, and the study
of other empirical topics in ecological psychology (e.g., Runeson & Frykholm, 1983; Rune-
son, Juslin, & Olsson, 2000; Van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & Van Leeuwen, 1994) and in cogni-
tive psychology (including the study of concepts and decision making; e.g., Kahneman,
2003; Medin, 1989).
In developmental psychology Michotte’s ideas and discoveries have also received a consid-
erable amount of study. Indeed, nearly all of the phenomena that Michotte discovered have
now been explored in developmental terms, including his work on amodal completion (e.g.,
Kellman & Spelke, 1983), the perception of complex motion conWgurations (e.g., Johnson,
Bremner, & Slater, 2003; Kaiser & ProYtt, 1984), object individuation (e.g., Carey & Xu,
2001), the tunnel eVect (e.g., Wilcox & Chapa, 2004), causal perception (e.g., Leslie & Keeble,
1987; Schlottmann, Allen, Linderoth, & Hesket, 2002), and other forms of causal processing
(e.g., Gelman & Gottfried, 1996). This work has also fueled several broader theories of
causal processing in humans, including the ideas of causal understanding as a developmen-
tal primitive (e.g., Corrigan & Denton, 1996; Mandler, 1992) and the idea that causal under-
standing has its origin in an innate perceptual module (e.g., Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).
In comparative psychology, Michotte also inspired work on the evolutionary origins of
most of these topics. Examples include studies of amodal completion in young  chicks
(Regolin & Vallortigara, 1995) and in baboons (Deruelle, Barbet, Depy, & Fagot, 2000);
dynamic object individuation and the tunnel eVect in rhesus macaques (Flombaum, Kun-
dey, Santos, & Scholl, 2004); the perception of causality in chimpanzees (O’Connell &
Dunbar, 2005); causal understanding in chimpanzees (Premack & Premack, 1994); and
causal reasoning in social interactions by baboons (Cheney, Seyfarth, & Silk, 1995).
In cognitive neuroscience, Michotte’s work has inspired research on the neural represen-
tation of occluded, hidden, or disappearing objects in monkey cortex (e.g., Baker, Keysers,
Jellema, Wicker, & Perrett, 2001; Kovacs, Vogels, & Orban, 1995); the detection of contin-
gency and animacy from simple animations in the human brain (e.g., Blakemore et al.,
2003); and the neural mechanisms underlying causal perception (e.g., Blakemore et al.,
2001; Fonlupt, 2003; Fugelsang, Roser, Corballis, Gazzaniga, & Dunbar, 2005).J. Wagemans et al. / Acta Psychologica 123 (2006) 1–19 7
In social psychology, we see an expansion of Michotte’s inXuence similar to that in cog-
nitive psychology. These connections not only include topics closely related to Michotte’s
work such as the role of spatio-temporal contingencies in the perception of social events
(Bassili,  1976)  and  causal  attribution,  felt responsibility,  and  helping  behavior  (Duval,
Duval, & Neely, 1979), but they also encompass more remote topics such as the construal
of social situations (Wittenbrink, Gist, & Hilton, 1997) and goal contagion (Aarts, Gollwit-
zer, & Hassin, 2004). More recently, we also see cross-cultural psychology addressing causal
perception and attribution (e.g., Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994;
Peng & Knowles, 2003).
Providing a complete list of instances in which Michotte’s work has inXuenced scientiWc
developments in other disciplines would extend beyond the aims of this editorial, but some
examples to illustrate the diversity of this impact may be useful. Given the relevance of
Michotte’s thinking for phenomenology, epistemology, and realism, his inXuence in philos-
ophy has naturally been strong and long-lasting, with citations in a wide variety of journals
(e.g., Journal of Philosophy, Linguistics and Philosophy, Nous, Philosophical Psychology,
Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philoso-
phy of Science, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Philosophy Today, Synthese, etc.) Less
obvious has been his inXuence in a number of diverse areas within the arts, humanities, and
social  sciences  (e.g.,  the  citations  in  Creativity  Research  Journal,  Discourse  Processing,
Ergonomics,  Human  Factors,  Journal  of  Anthropological  Research,  Journal  of  Art  and
Design Education, Journal of Forecasting, Leonardo, Linguistics, Musical Quarterly, Poetics,
etc.), and even more remote areas in computer science (e.g., the citations in ACM Transac-
tions on Graphics, Advanced Robotics, Autonomous Robots, Computer Vision and Image
Understanding, Topics in ArtiWcial Intelligence, etc.).
The work mentioned in this section collectively illustrates both the depth and breadth of
Michotte’s lasting impact in cognitive science and beyond. This ongoing inXuence is per-
haps especially notable in light of the fact that his work was published long ago, and in a
language that is inaccessible to the majority of present-day scientists. In the Wnal two sec-
tions of this editorial, we will take a closer look at two of Michotte’s core themes: amodal
completion and the perception of causality. In each case, we will discuss the contemporary
landscape of these topics in somewhat more detail, and also note the contributions of the
relevant papers in this special issue.
4. Amodal completion
Michotte’s seminal research on amodal completion is perhaps the best example of his
talent for deriving deep insights about the mind from relatively mundane observations. We
often view objects that are partially occluded by other objects, yet we experience them as
complete. For most of us, scientists and laypeople alike, this observation seems somehow
too obvious to be important. Like many other aspects of visual perception, however, those
phenomena that seem most commonplace are often those that reXect some of the most
important underlying visual processing. Michotte Wrst brought such observations into the
realm of scientiWc investigation, and also coined the terms “modal completion” and “amo-
dal completion”, which of course are still the terms under which most research on such
phenomena are discussed today.
Whereas modal completions have a strong phenomenal presence, amodal completions
often have a less pronounced  character.  The distinction between  modal  and amodal8 J. Wagemans et al. / Acta Psychologica 123 (2006) 1–19
corresponds to the presence or absence, respectively, of certain visual qualities in the
completion (such as visible luminance diVerences). Modal completions have a vivid per-
ceptual presence and are nowadays frequently studied by way of the well-known “pac-
man” conWgurations inspired by Kanizsa (1979); (e.g., the so-called “Kanizsa triangle”).
Here, the speciWc stimulus characteristics trigger the perception of illusory contours and
surfaces, resulting from modal completion. Amodal completions have often been studied
by means of relatively simple line drawings that can readily be interpreted as conWgura-
tions in which one surface partly covers another surface. In such cases no illusory con-
tours  are  perceived,  yet  observers  often  have  a  strong  sense  that  the  partly  covered
surface continues behind the covering surface – revealing, as Michotte et al. noted, a
compelling  perception  of  unity  joining  the  visible  parts.  Although  the  distinction
between modal and amodal completion is important for several reasons, note that they
often co-occur in visual percepts: for example, when the illusory Kanizsa triangle is seen
(modally), the indented “pacmen” which serve to deWne it also appear to be completed
(amodally) behind the illusory triangle, which is then seen to occlude the pacmen.3
As with his work on the perception of causality (as outlined in the next section), Mich-
otte and his colleagues emphasized the fundamentally visual nature of amodal comple-
tion. Of course, in such situations it is in some sense rational to infer the existence of
completed contours behind occluders, but such inferences would not be especially inter-
esting or worthy of direct study. In contrast, Michotte stressed that the “inference” under-
lying amodal completion appears to be a relatively hardwired aspect of visual processing
– and as such, can (and will automatically) occur despite strongly-held beliefs to the con-
trary. For example, if you draw a triangle with pronounced gaps in two of its sides, you
will see not a triangle, but rather two unconnected sets of contours. If the two gaps are
then covered with a pencil, however, the percept qualitatively changes, in violation of our
knowledge and our local experience concerning what really lies beneath the pencil: We
now see an outlined triangle partially obscured by the pencil – “a single and complete
whole”. Moreover, the precise nature of such completions can also violate our beliefs and
recent experience. For example, Michotte et al. (1964) discuss the perception of a similar
set of contours whose gaps are connected not via linear extrapolations (to form an out-
lined triangle) but by crises-crossing lines which yield two distinct closed shapes. When
those contours are covered by the pencil, however, the percept again shifts to a simple
outlined triangle. In this way, Michotte’s work on amodal completion served to inspire
the idea of “visual inferences”, which are rational (and perhaps based on the statistics of
the environment), but are realized via hardwired visual computations. This perspective
has continued to play a prominent role in research on visual perception, helping to inspire
contemporary views of “visual intelligence” (e.g., HoVman, 1998), the “logic of percep-
tion” (e.g., Rock, 1983), and, more generally, of perception as a constructive act, creating
a rich world with properties and sensations that are not directly available in the proximal
stimulus.
3 This connection between the perception of occlusion and illusory contours is so intimate that a recent model
has taken depth perception to be the primary force behind the perception of illusory contours and surfaces in the
Kanizsa Wgures (Kogo, Strecha, Caenen, Wagemans, & Van Gool, 2002). According to this model, local occlusion
cues give rise to a depth layering which then leads to surface Wlling-in and illusory contours, rather than starting
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Since Michotte there has been an enormous amount of work on modal and amodal
completion, including the similarities and diVerences between these two processes (e.g.,
Gold, Murray, Bennett, & Sekuler, 2000; Shipley & Kellman, 1992; Singh, 2004). In the Wrst
place, many contemporary studies have veriWed the visual nature of amodal completion,
showing that such stimulus conWgurations are really treated as completed wholes even in
early (e.g., preattentive) visual processing, as revealed by both psychophysical studies (e.g.,
using visual search; Enns & Rensink, 1998) and in neuroscientiWc investigations (e.g., using
single unit recording in nonhuman primates; Sugita, 1999). The visual nature of such per-
cepts has been investigated further by means of a variety of experimental paradigms, for
instance, dealing with the microgenesis of these completions (e.g., De Wit & Van Lier,
2002; Rauschenberger & Yantis, 2001; Sekuler, 1994; Sekuler & Palmer, 1992; Van Lier,
Leeuwenberg, & Van der Helm, 1995).
Many other contemporary studies have attempted to determine the precise manner by
which  the  visual  system  computes  the  particular  perceived  shape  of  completions,
employing frameworks ranging from high-level simplicity metrics (e.g., BuVart, Leeu-
wenberg, & Restle, 1981) to lower-level neural dynamics (e.g., Grossberg & Mingolla,
1985). An important question here is the extent to which completions are merely inXu-
enced by certain local properties of the partly occluded edges at, or near, the points of
occlusion (e.g., Fantoni & Gerbino, 2003; Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Wouterlood & Bose-
lie, 1992), or whether overall shape characteristics such as symmetry also inXuence the
perceived shape (e.g., Boselie, 1994; De Wit, Mol, & Van Lier, 2005; De Wit & Van Lier,
2002; Sekuler, 1994; Van Lier, Van der Helm, & Leeuwenberg, 1994, 1995). As men-
tioned earlier, the study of amodal completion has also been extended from 2D patterns
to 3D objects (e.g., Kellman et al., 2005; Tse, 1999a, 1999b; Van Lier & Wagemans, 1999).
These 3D completion studies are particularly important in that they stress the ways in
which amodal completion is intimately related to object perception in general. (Such
studies also emphasize the role of completion of self-occluded parts – e.g., of the rear of
an object – which has also been stressed by Michotte et al. (1964), in the context of the
amodal presence of the rear half of a sphere.) More recently, these themes have begun to
be investigated with human brain imaging techniques (e.g., De Wit, Bauer, Oostenveld,
Fries, & Van Lier, in press; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; Murray, Foxe, Javitt, & Foxe,
2004).
Many of the themes raised above – as well as several important ongoing challenges in
this area – are also the focus of other papers in this special issue. Fulvio and Singh (2006)
address the theme of local vs. global factors by demonstrating that local contour geometry
is not suYcient to determine the shape of modal completions, and that a region-based
analysis appears to provide a much better Wt to the observed completions. The particular
perceptual qualities of modal completions also play an important role in the paper of Van
Lier, de Wit, and Koning (2006), who show that Wgure-ground segregation can reveal
rather ambiguous percepts when illusory contours are misaligned with luminance edges.
The paper by Bertamini and Hulleman (2006) carries this issue one step further by examin-
ing the amodal completion of regions visible through holes. Their analysis, which is an
excellent example of Michotte’s “experimental phenomenology”, addresses both static and
dynamic cases. The fourth and Wnal paper on amodal completion in this special issue, by
Kawachi and Gyoba (2006), focuses more directly on dynamic aspects of completion, as
revealed in Michotte’s “tunnel eVect”. They provide a new way to indirectly measure the
representational persistence of dynamically occluded objects in the tunnel eVect, via the10 J. Wagemans et al. / Acta Psychologica 123 (2006) 1–19
facilitation of same-diVerent responses to the object before it disappears behind the tunnel
and after it reappears at the other end. Their paper may thus help to place the study of the
tunnel eVect on equally Wrm methodological ground as the study of static amodal comple-
tion (see also Flombaum & Scholl, in press).
All of the studies reviewed above and in the other papers in this special issue emphasize
both the importance and contemporary appeal of visual completion processes. The lasting
inXuence of such phenomena in perception research can perhaps be attributed to the same
theme mentioned at the beginning of this section: their ubiquity in everyday visual experi-
ence. It is perhaps Wtting, then, to close this section by emphasizing the importance and
scope of such processing in Michotte’s own words (Michotte et al., 1964, taken from the
translation in Thinès et al., 1991, p. 165):
“It would be diYcult to exaggerate the importance of these perceptual completions.
To convince ourselves of this we need only cast a critical eye about us, at the furni-
ture in the room, for example, or at the traYc in a street. It is astonishing how rare it
is to Wnd examples of objects where the side facing the observer is completely uncov-
ered. Nearly all of them have parts hidden by other objects (screens), and despite this
the shapes we see are neither interrupted nor breeched. Indeed it is clear that the
world as it appears to us is not made up of fragments of objects but of things with
complete shape presented to us in this way despite the partial and temporary conceal-
ment happens to them. This is to a great extent due to the formation of amodal com-
pletions (ƒ)”.
5. The perception of causality
Michotte’s canonical demonstration of causal perception – and perhaps his best-known
stimulus  –  was  the  “launching  eVect”.  In  this  stimulus,  one  object  (A)  moves  toward
another stationary object (B) until they are adjacent, at which point A stops and B starts
moving along the same path. Michotte’s fundamental observation about this event is that
it is in fact perceived as an event: beyond its objective kinematics (i.e., as two objects mov-
ing at certain times and to certain locations), we also see a collision, wherein A causes B’s
motion.
In his seminal book La perception de la causalité (1946/1954/1963), Michotte reported
more than 100 studies of the launching eVect and related stimuli, working out in consider-
able detail just how and when the perception of causality does and does not occur in such
displays. In the course of this work, he studied the roles of various types of spatiotemporal
patterns (including well-known non-causal variants of launching with spatial and temporal
gaps); various types of motion (including apparent motion); speeds and speed ratios; path
lengths and angles; object sizes; eccentricity and viewing distance; surface features such as
color and shape; and many other factors. More than this, though, Michotte developed a
theory of the nature of causal perception, which emphasized its automaticity, its strict
dependence on subtle display details, and its relative immunity from higher-level intentions
and beliefs. Michotte analyzed the perception of causality in the launching eVect as a con-
Xict between the perception of two distinct objects, but one continuous motion. The com-
promise made by the visual system in this situation preserved both factors: in the launching
eVect, we thus see a single motion, which is transferred to (or, in Michotte’s terms, “phe-
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Michotte’s work on causal perception was important and innovative in at least six ways:
• First, it changed how we typically think of the goals of perception, suggesting that
beyond recovering the physical structure of the world, the visual system also attempts to
recover its causal structure.
• Second, this work pointed to an intersection of sorts, between the study of perception
and cognition. Before Michotte, nearly all writers had treated causality as a high-level
cognitive concept, and tended to think of the currency of perception in terms of only
lower-level properties such as color, texture, and motion. Michotte, in this context, dem-
onstrated that even seemingly-“cognitive” properties such as causality may be processed
in the visual system.
• Third, Michotte’s work on causal perception revealed the promise of his program of
“experimental phenomenology”. Whereas psychologists had long swung between the
poles of pure introspection and anti-mental behaviorism, Michotte’s work showed how
phenomenal percepts could be identiWed, measured, and explained via careful demon-
strations and experiments.
• Fourth,  Michotte’s  studies  were  highly  methodologically  innovative  in  their  day.
Whereas most previous researchers had cleaved to static stimuli – in large part due to
the  technical  diYculties  of  creating  well-controlled  dynamic  displays  –  Michotte
devised brilliant new methods of stimulus presentation. Perhaps most famously, his ini-
tial studies of launching were created by drawing various intricate spirals on discs, and
then rotating those discs; when viewed through a small slit, these spirals appeared as
small Wgures which translated back and forth, yielding his stimuli (for a photograph of
Michotte demonstrating this apparatus, see Fig. 2). This work remains a superlative
example of how clever instrumentation can overcome technical challenges in perception
research.
Fig. 2. A photograph of Michotte during his presidential lecture at the International Congress of Psychology in
Brussels in 1957, explaining his research on the perception of causality and demonstrating the apparatus with the
turning discs to create the stimulus displays.12 J. Wagemans et al. / Acta Psychologica 123 (2006) 1–19
• Fifth, Michotte’s view of causality as rooted in automatic visual processing was also
highly theoretically innovative, and provided a stark contrast to previous philosophical
theories such as those of Hume and de Biran. In this way, his work illustrates how psy-
chological work can inform philosophical theorizing. For example, Hume (1740/1960,
1748/1977)  famously  argued  that  our  notions  of  cause  and  eVect  must  arise  from
repeated  experiences  and  noticed  correlations,  since  no  mark  of  causation  can  be
directly  perceived  from  any  possible  sensory  evidence.  Strikingly,  Hume’s  favorite
example when expounding this view was physical causality, as in one billiard ball hitting
another.  Since  this  theorizing  was  conducted  from  the  armchair,  though,  Michotte
(1963) suggested that “it seems certain that Hume did not realise that there was such a
thing as a causal impression” (p. 255) and that “if Hume had been able to carry out an
experiment such as ours, there is no doubt that he would have been led to revise his
views on the psychological origin of the popular idea of causality” (p. 256).
• Sixth, Michotte’s seminal book on causal perception provided a new – and still highly
unusual – model of how to conduct and report a scientiWc research project. Nearly all
perception and cognition research in Michotte’s day, as now, was reported piecemeal,
split into small chunks that were disseminated in various journal articles and book
chapters. Michotte’s work, in contrast, illustrates the value of conducting a long-term
comprehensive study of a single phenomenon, and then communicating it as a single
cohesive  report.  This  “monument  of  careful  and  sustained  investigation”  (OldWeld,
1949, p.104) remains extremely unusual today (though for one contemporary exception
see Mack & Rock, 1998), and may help to explain Michotte’s lasting inXuence.
Since Michotte, many other investigators have extended both the breadth and depth of
our understanding of causal perception. Beyond the developmental, neuroscientiWc, and
comparative research already alluded to earlier in this article, recent investigations have
explored the inXuence on causal perception of diVerent types of motion (e.g., apparent
motion; Gordon, Day, & Stecher, 1990); attention (e.g., Choi & Scholl, 2004), and eye
movements (e.g., Hindmarch, 1973); a wider variety of spatiotemporal patterns (e.g., Choi
&  Scholl,  2006;  Natsoulas,  1961;  Schlottmann  &  Anderson,  1993;  Schlottmann,  Ray,
Mitchell, & Demetriou, 2006; Yela, 1952); inXuences from other modalities (e.g., Guski &
Troje, 2003) and higher-level expectations (e.g., White, 2005); Gestalt grouping (e.g., Choi
& Scholl, 2004) and other contextual factors (e.g., Scholl & Nakayama, 2002, 2004); and
many other factors.
Although published research on causal perception has increased dramatically in recent
years, this renaissance still faces some key challenges, several of which are addressed by the
other papers in this special issue:
• Explaining causal perception: Despite the wealth of data on causal perception, it still
remains unclear how and whether such phenomena can be explained in terms of deeper
principles. One possibility, in keeping with many other types of visual processing, is that
causal perception may be explained by appeal to coincidence avoidance. In the launching
eVect, for example, the temporal coincidence between the arrival of the Wrst object and
the movement of the second object may be treated as non-accidental, and in need of
some explanation. The percept of causality may provide this explanation, and this theo-
retical framework may also explain many other eVects of causal perception (Choi &
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White (2006) suggests that a diVerent framework, based on schema matching, may be
critical. In this view, simple patterns such as those studied by Michotte may be com-
pared to stored templates of previously encountered patterns, and such matches may
imbue such stimuli with richer interpretations involving causality, which are not explicit
in the simpler stimuli themselves. It will be important for future work to test these and
other potential explanatory frameworks against the full body of results related to causal
perception, and to devise ways of testing them directly.
• The scope of causal perception: Another theme of White’s (2006) contribution to this
special  issue  concerns  the  scope  of  causal  perception:  beyond  Michotte’s  focus  on
launching, entraining, triggering, and a few other related displays, White argues that we
can perceive causality in a much wider variety of patterns, such as enforced disintegra-
tion (White & Milne, 1999) and pulling (White & Milne, 1997). The contributions to this
special issue by Schlottmann et al. (2006) and Saxe and Carey (2006) also widen the
scope  of  perceived  causality,  noting  similarities  and  diVerences  between  percepts  of
physical and social causality. Such studies raise the possibility that Michotte’s work has
only scratched the surface of this domain, and future studies may discover many other
types of causal perception: causal perception may be only a single case-study of event
perception, but launching may also be only a single case-study of causal perception.
• The origin and speciWcity of causal perception: In their contribution to this special issue,
Saxe  and  Carey  (2006)  review  Michotte’s  contention  that  causal  perception  has  an
innate basis, and the various experiments with infants which support this view. Many
other investigators have similarly suggested that mechanisms of causal perception may
– like many other aspects of vision – be a specialized part of our genetic endowment
(e.g., Choi & Scholl, 2004; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Scholl & Nakayama, 2002; Scholl &
Tremoulet, 2000). At the same time, other investigators have stressed the possible role of
individual diVerences and learning in causal perception (e.g., Cohen, Amsel, Redford, &
Casasola, 1998; Oakes, 1994; Schlottmann, 2000; Schlottmann et al., 2002; White, 1995;
Young, Rogers, & Beckmann, 2005). The new wave of developmental studies described
by Saxe and Carey (2006) may help to bring a new focus on this issue, given that the ini-
tial wave of infant studies by Leslie and colleagues has failed to resolve this debate.
Other methods might also be usefully employed to study the speciWcity of causal percep-
tion. For example, though behavioral work has suggested that causal perception meets
most of the criteria of modularity (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), to our knowledge no neu-
ropsychological research has explored the possibility of speciWc impairments in causal
perception with brain damage. Finally, as also explored in detail by Saxe and Carey
(2006),  there are now  enough  developmental  data on  causal perception  to evaluate
Michotte’s suggestion that this domain provides the Wrst notion of causality in the mind,
from which other types of causal reasoning may later develop.
• Measuring causal perception: Despite the phenomenal appeal of causal perception, its
precise measurement has proven diYcult. Michotte’s initial studies – and the vast major-
ity of contemporary studies – involved direct reports and ratings of causal perception.
When used carefully such probes can yield useful and rigorous data, quantifying the
probability of causal percepts over many trials and observers, as in the contribution to
this special issue by Schlottmann et al. (2006). Nevertheless, as stressed by Choi and
Scholl (2006a) in their contribution to this special issue, such methods have several
problems – especially when they fail to adequately distinguish percepts and higher-level
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other more implicit measures of causal perception, e.g., based on priming (Kruschke &
Fragassi, 1996), representational momentum (Hubbard, Blessum, & Ruppel, 2001), spa-
tial illusions (Scholl & Nakayama, 2004), or neural signatures (e.g., Fugelsang et al.,
2005). Nevertheless, Choi and Scholl (2006a) argue that such attempts have not yet been
successful, and that we are still in great need of new dependent measures which are able
to track causal perception implicitly with both rigor and quantitative precision.
6. Conclusion
The progress and challenges described in the preceding two sections of this editorial
emphasize both how much inXuence Michotte has had on contemporary perception and
cognition research, and how much important work remains to be done. We hope that the
papers in this special issue will serve both to celebrate Michotte’s heritage in this respect,
and to inspire other investigators to continue the projects he began.
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